ten treated as belonging to isolated historical contexts. Therefore, although the cross-disciplinary field of literature and science has thrived during the past decades, substantial hesitation can be observed in combining the field of literature and literary criticism with the field of mathematics.
1 Recently, interest in mathematics has increased within literature and science, and case studies have highlighted new perspectives on mathematics and the arts.
2 However, when these two disciplines have met, the nexus has often been in biographical studies of cross-disciplinary individuals (like Lewis Carroll) or in focusing on instances of literature that incorporate mathematics in one form or the other (like Edwin Abbott's Flatland).
In this essay we present a broader and more integrative perspective on the relation between literary criticism and mathematics by juxtaposing a particular mathematical development from the early nineteenth century with a synchronous development in literary criticism. Therefore important mathematical developments of the 1820s, such as the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries, new impossibility results, and new proof ideals, exhibit structural similarities with notions of Romantic irony developed by literary critic and philosopher Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829). These mathematical breakthroughs are well-known and extensively studied in the history of mathematics in all their technical and biographical contingencies. And yet, from this perspective alone they often seem isolated, surprising, and in need of additional historical explanation. As we will show in the following, both fields-mathematics and literary criticism-were at the time trying to come to terms with new Kantian views and both experienced shifting perspectives, but in different ways. Mathematical notions of proof, reality, solution, and solvability can and should be seen in relation to contemporary thought developed by literary critics and poets of the Romantic period. And by analyzing Schlegel's concept of Romantic irony in relation to these key mathematical examples we are led to suggest a new and rich way of bridging the historiographical fields that deal with literature and mathematics. This contribution to historiography is twofold: we shed new light on a set of important mathematical developments, while at the same time bringing the historiography of both mathematics and literature to bear on each other on a deeper structural level.
In recent years the interests of key Romantic writers in contemporary science have received substantial attention, and historians of both literature and science have become aware that there are deeper connections and inspirations between Romantic authors and science. 3 In particular, case studies have focused on authors who were either scientists themselves or who incorporated science in their writings-for instance, Samuel T. Coleridge (1772-1834), Johann W. von Goethe (1749 Goethe ( -1832 , and Novalis (Georg Phillipp F. L. von Hardenberg 1772 Hardenberg -1801 . Whenever mathematics has entered into the field of literature and science, studies have especially favored the poet and philosopher Novalis, who was also an informed follower of mathematics and therefore regarded as a natural point of convergence. In particular, Novalis's aphorisms about mathematics have had wide literary appeal and created ample room for interpretation. In addition, Hans Niels Jahnke has used Novalis's reception of the so-called combinatorial school to draw attention to the use of mathematics by nonspecialists as a "resonating body" that can shed light on profound changes within mathematics.
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In the following we go beyond the biographical coincidences between mathematics and literature to establish how both fields struggled with the Kantian divide between the Ding an sich and the Ding für uns and devise structurally similar means for bridging it. This divide between the real and the ideal is a defining feature of Ro- manticism in general and well-captured in the following quotation by historian of music Donald Grout: "Romanticism cherishes freedom, movement, passion, and endless pursuit of the unattainable. Just because its goal can never be attained, Romantic art is haunted by a spirit of longing, of yearning after an impossible fulfillment." 5 Such themes resonate with important narratives about mathematics of the early nineteenth century that have pointed to a transition in mathematics toward a new form of creativity often associated with the emergence of mathematical geniuses like Évariste Galois (1811-1832), János Bolyai (1802-1860), Carl Friedrich Gauss (1777-1855), and Niels Henrik Abel (1802-1829) who share aspects of the Romantic genius.
6 These mathematicians redefined the relationship between mathematics and the physical world, not least through the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries that defied long-held views about both physical and mathematical spaces. Through such new discoveries on the relations between physics and mathematics and new perspectives on the boundaries of mathematical knowledge, they came to usher in the era of mathematics as an autonomous and creative discipline, especially in the German neo-humanistic movement. 7 Central to this narrative are the key mathematical concepts of the infinite and the impossible that attained new importance during the Romantic period as mathematicians grappled with the fundamental Kantian divide and sought for their discipline a profound way of regarding the ideal realm.
In the following we first present the notion of Romantic irony based on analyses of Schlegel's fragments, and outline three central mathematical developments as instances of our analyses. Then we discuss the structural similarities between the two fields as they 5. Donald Grout, qtd. in Jim Henle, "Classical Mathematics," American Mathematical Monthly 103:1 (1996): 18-29. 6 . For an influential example of the style of the romanticized biography of mathematics, see E. T. Bell, Men of Mathematics (1937; reprint, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986 struggled to come to terms with the Kantian divide. This leads us to further discuss some benefits of an integrative approach to the historiography of mathematics and literature.
Schlegel's Universal Poetry and Irony
Among the writers of the German Romantic movement who actively pursued a philosophy of literature and art in the aftermath of Immanuel Kant's (1724-1804) Kritik der reinen Vernuft (1781), Schlegel took a central position in the Jena-centered group of philosophers. 8 Together with his brother August (1767-1845), Friedrich sought after ways to understand and overcome the Kantian divide between the real and the ideal, and as numerous other writers did, they argued that the only way to approach the ideal would be through poetry. 9 In particular, Friedrich developed the concept of Romantic irony through a number of fragments in his Kritische Fragmente published in the journal Lyceum (1797) and the philosophical journal Athenäum (1799-1800), to which Novalis also was a prominent contributor. To Friedrich the fragmentary form was a new form of writing; the fragments can be read in random order while they simultaneously relate to one another. Thus a single fragment is always part of a whole, corresponding to the philosophical point of an unattainable entirety.
10 Consequently the fragments do form a coherent theory and are difficult to analyze in isolation, but in the following we present an outline of the most relevant aspects of Schlegel's Romantic irony.
Athenäum fragment 116 is often analyzed as one of the key fragments expressing Schlegel's philosophy of art and literature. He wanted a "progressive universal poetry" (progressive Universalpoesie) combining different genres of text and resulting in a poetry that dealt with poetry. This new form of poetry should, according to him, also include literary criticism and thereby challenge the traditional illusion of poetry being exclusively works of fiction. Therefore by merging traditional poetry and meta-theory a universal poetry would emerge.
11 He wrote that forever be becoming and never be perfected.
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Thus according to Schlegel Romantic poetry centered on an ongoing state of becoming, but never reaching its ideal goal, and in so doing poetry would provide a bridge to the Kantian divide. Schlegel's universal poetry is, importantly, a meta-poetry that can include and reflect on all forms of poetry. Linked to this universal poetry and its promise of transcendence and universality is the concept of irony as suggested through Schlegel's fragments. In its core form his version of irony is far more complex than the traditional rhetorical form of an author stating something other than what he believes. Instead, Schlegel's Romantic irony is a means of expressing the inexpressible in literature and art-that is, an attempt to convey through the written word something that one cannot state explicitly in writing. Romantic irony was thus a way for the Romantic poet to reach the ideal realm from his or her own position within the restricted realm of reality. According to Schlegel's fragment 112, the irony consists of two opposing forces-thesis and anti-thesis-and is therefore, as he states in fragment 48, a paradoxical form. At the same time, the two forces are both separate and dependent on each other for their existence. With irony the poet has the means to disturb the illusion of reality in his or her work and point to what lies beyond and even the process by which it was created. For instance, in his Lyceum fragment 42 he uses the example of the Italian Buffo, a figure in the comedia dell'arte tradition, whose role is to point out the illusion of the play.
13 Schlegel's irony is precisely this type of Buffo by pointing out that the work of fiction is indeed a work of fiction.
The irony of Romantic irony (as it were) lies in the simultaneous presence of two different statements that can neither be reconciled nor chosen between, as Schlegel made clear in his fragments. 14 In his essay Über die Unverständichkeit (1800) he described how humans depend on dialogue: mankind is continuously in a progressive though infinite process of creation that has no goal, and in this way 12. Friedrich Schlegel, Athenäum fragment 116, in Philosophical Fragments, trans. P. Firchow (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), pp. 31-32.
13. Ibid., Lyceum fragment 42, pp. 5-6. 14. Behler, German Romantic Literary Theory (above, n. 8), pp. 141-142. human progression is similar to Romantic poetry. Importantly, no absolute meta-language exists for such analyses, but it must still be referred to because, as Schlegel pointed out, only something incomplete can point toward the complete. In the end, language restricts the successful communication of messages, and irony is a way of pointing out the discrepancy between what is written literally and what is said on a metaphorical or figurative level.
15 Thus progressive poetry points toward the unattainable infinite from within the limits of the finite, and Schlegel's Romantic irony is the paradoxical coexistence of two opposing poles, one creative and the other reflective: the one pole (the thesis) creates the illusion of the work, whereas the other (the antithesis) is aware of this illusion and breaks it down, for instance by making the characters or the reader aware of the fact that the work is fiction or by suddenly breaking with the style of the work.
Although Schlegel's literary criticism deals mainly with literature and philosophy he also showed a brief and limited interest in mathematics, quite unlike Novalis's genuine understanding of the nature of mathematics. Behler writes, quoting Schlegel:
Schlegel liked to describe the pathway of thought in terms of mathematical symbols and cited some philosophers for whom everything is circular, others who think in the form of triplicity, and yet another group for whom the ellipse is characteristic. The group of authors he had in mind were writers in the form of "crooked lines, who, although progressing with noticeable steadiness and regularity, can manifest themselves only in fragments because one of their centers lies in the infinite." 16 Schlegel therefore refers to mathematics as a kind of metaphorical language corresponding to a particular form of philosophy. And although it is tempting to use these arguments as a starting point for an analysis of mathematics in light of Schlegel's theories, this approach does not seem very productive from a mathematical point of view. Schlegel's references to crooked lines, points at infinity, the ellipse, and so on resonate with the ideas in algebraic and projective geometry developing around the time, but it does not readily correspond to any deep appreciation of the central undertakings and problems in early nineteenth-century mathematics as a whole. Instead, in the following we will conjoin our analyses of Romantic irony and universal poetry with two developments from within the core of nineteenth-century mathematics.
New Epistemological Challenges in Mathematics
At around the same time as poets and critics were devising methods of dealing with the ideal realm through Romantic poetry, new epistemological ideas were also being forged in the domain of mathematics and put to use on issues that showed marked similarities to the yearning for infinity or the Buffo. These epistemological approaches are, of course, parts of a much larger cognitive and professional development of mathematics during the nineteenth century and relate to questions that were extensively studied by mathematicians of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, but for which the period 1800 to 1825 provided radically different and innovative solutions.
17 Two particular instances illustrate the structural similarities with Romantic literary criticism at their very core: the realization that Euclidean space is not a mathematical necessity, and the profound changes in the view of mathematical tools and results brought about by the study of the limits of algebraic solutions to equations. These two instances, each in their different way, critically address issues of the Kantian doctrines as they applied to mathematics. 18 The discovery of non-Euclidean geometry is frequently regarded as a severe obstacle to Kant's idea that Anschauung (human perception) in essence is founded on the pure intuition of (Euclidean) space, and the fact that because not all equations can be solved algebraically signaled a change from mathematics as a science of formulas toward a more concept-based view of the discipline, eventually lending credence to viewing mathematics as a language to be studied (rather than as a domain of objects and knowledge) as would become prominent about a century later. As such non-Euclidean geometry and algebraic unsolvability of equations belong to an extended intellectual and professional development in which mathematics gradually redefined its ontological connections to the natural sciences inherited from the scientific revolution and placed more emphasis on free creation and epistemic and professional autonomy where, for example, geometry was gradually generalized and released from its close connections to the study of physical space. 
Worlds Created Out of Nothing: Non-Euclidean Geometries
For centuries mathematicians had revered the Euclidean edifice of geometry. However, ever since antiquity, commentators on Euclid's Elements discussed one of the five postulates of geometry-namely, the so-called parallel postulate.
19 Because this postulate was significantly different in nature and complexity from the others it was thought that it should be a provable theorem rather than an unproved assumption, and over the centuries multiple attempts were made to deduce it from the other four postulates. In an amazing instance of independent simultaneous discoveries, three nineteenthcentury mathematicians came to realize that the parallel postulate of Euclid was indeed independent of the other axioms of geometry.
The young Hungarian mathematician Bolyai and the Russian Nikolai Ivanovich Lobachevsky (1792-1856) had independently reached similar conclusions. By assuming the negation of the fifth postulate they constructed a new geometry, in important ways similar to Euclidean geometry and yet very different. In this new non-Euclidean geometry the parallel to a given line through a given point was not unique and the sum of the angles in a triangle was less than and not equal to two right angles (180°), as every student had been taught for generations. In fact, Euclidean geometry was so established and accepted as the formal mathematical treatment of physical space that Kant could advance his idea about Anschauung as being structured by pure intuitions of space (by necessity Euclidean) and time.
Although the discoveries of Bolyai and Lobachevsky were almost simultaneous and certainly independent of each other, it could be argued that the time was ripe for the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry during the first decades of the nineteenth century. Unknown to most contemporaries, the simultaneous discovery of such geometry by Bolyai and Lobachevsky had actually been anticipated by Gauss. As he reported in a letter, Gauss had suppressed publication of his results for fear of the reaction of the philosophers who, since Kant, had regarded space and time as categories and the associated mathematical fields of arithmetic and geometry as a priori. When the very foundations of geometry were shaken by the discov-19. Euclid's parallel postulate stipulates that "two straight lines, when intersected by a third straight line such that the interior angles on one side are together less than two right angles, will meet when prolonged indefinitely to the side where the two interior angles are less than two right angles." An equivalent version known as Playfair's axiom states that to a given straight line and a point outside that line, a unique straight line can be drawn through the point that does not intersect the first straight line. See Euclid, The Thirteen Books of The Elements, 2nd ed., 3 vols., ed. Thomas L. Heath (New York: Dover Publications, 1956), pp. 1:202-220. ery of non-Euclidean geometry Gauss rightly feared the "cry of the Boethians."
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The common plan of attack for proving the fifth postulate in Greek, Islamic, and early modern mathematics was to assume its negation, deduce as many consequences as possible, and search for a contradiction. By the early eighteenth century Giovanni Girolamo Saccheri (1667-1733) had followed this to the point of uncovering new results of the theory of what is called "absolute geometry"-that is, geometry that is independent of both the parallel postulate and its negation. Saccheri's ambition was to "free Euclid of every flaw" by deducing logically absurd results from the assumption of the negation of the parallel postulate. However, by the end of his life he could point only to certain results that he felt "violated the nature of the straight line," whose precise definition in Euclidean terms was, however, not very precise. With this central change of perspective both Bolyai and Lobachevsky rediscovered and recast many of Saccheri's findings in more positive terms as properties of an entirely new form of geometry in which both straight and parallel lines were appropriately defined. While still in the process of uncovering these features Bolyai triumphantly wrote to his father, " [a] 
t this point I can only say so much: I have created a new and different world out of nothing [daß ich aus Nichts eine neue, andere Welt geschaffen habe]."
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The correspondence of Bolyai with his father, who was also a mathematician, includes many such examples of struggles of mathematical creativity at the border between breakthrough and despair.
It is also important to note that although the discovery of nonEuclidean geometry can be viewed as a negative result-a proof that something (that is, a proof of the fifth postulate) cannot be accomplished-it was the positive, creative aspect that Bolyai praised and valued so highly. Mathematics was, at least in this instance, a science with the magnificent potential for "pure creation from nothing," with almost divine connotations. And as such the restrictions of Euclidean geometry were pointed out by proving the possibility of a non-Euclidean alternative. logical flaw in one geometrical system would also protrude into the other one. As such, formal mathematics cannot distinguish between the two axiom systems in terms of consistency, and it indeed, as Gauss suggested, becomes an a posteriori question of physics or astronomy to decide the precise nature of physical space. The discovery of non-Euclidean geometry thus meant that geometry (and mathematics more generally) was separating itself from being the tool to describe physical reality and gradually becoming an autonomous discipline placing greater emphasis on the role of the creative genius ("freie Schöpfung").
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Impossibilities, Representations, and Representability During the first decades of the nineteenth century the mathematical discipline dealing with the solution of equations developed in unexpected directions. Since the late Renaissance the mathematics community had known of procedures for solving equations up to the fourth degree. However, for equations of the fifth degree and higher the solution by algebraic means-that is, by the four common operations and the extraction of roots-had eluded even the greatest mathematicians.
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In René Descartes's (1596-1650) seminal work in mathematics, La géométrie (1637), he stated that for an equation of degree n, n solutions (called roots) would exist, although some of them would be "real" and others would be purely "imagined" or "imaginary. 
In general an equation of degree n can be written in the form
x n + a n-1 x n-1 + . . . + a 1 x + a 0 = 0 in which x is the unknown quantity and a 0 , . . . a n-1 are constants called coefficients. The problem of solving equations was thus to produce a formula expressing the unknown (root) x in terms of the coefficients (which were considered known but arbitrary) a 0 , . . . a n-1 . If the solution was to be an algebraic one the formula should only include the four elementary operations (addition, subtraction, multiplication, division) and the extraction of roots. Thus the formula x = is an algebraic solution corresponding to the equation ax 2 + bx + c = 0. This formula allows one-once the language of algebraic notation has been mastered and one understands the algorithmic (procedural) nature of the formula-to find the hitherto unknown quantity x from the given coefficients a,b,c (equivalent to a 2 ,a 1 ,a 0 in the general equation above).
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Joseph Louis Lagrange (1736-1813) sought to prove this result, which has come to be known as the "fundamental theorem of algebra." The first step toward a formalization of the result and proof was to specify the nature of the purported imaginary roots. Despite all efforts and a common belief that the result was essentially correct, proofs often fell short of the goal. But around 1800 Gauss, the young German mathematical prodigy, radically transformed the theory of equations when he published a novel proof of the fundamental theorem of algebra (1799) and a seminal book, Disquisitiones arithmeticae (1801). 24 Gauss's proof was original in many ways. First, it started out with a thorough criticism of all existing proofs, including those of d'Alembert, Euler, and Lagrange, in particular pointing out where they lacked in rigor and used false reasoning. Second, Gauss's proof did not use traditional algebraic techniques of investigation, but instead transformed the problem into geometry and used geometrical arguments to prove the fundamental theorem, thereby harnessing the power of a disciplinary change of perspective on the problem. And last, his proof had the peculiar feature of proving that something existed by an indirect argument. By supposing the nonexistence of the solution and reaching a contradiction by deductions, Gauss could prove that the solution had to exist without being in any way able to point to or characterize it in a way that would help in figuring out what its numerical value was.
All these features are indicative of the beginning of change in the epistemic standards of mathematics, where more conceptual reasoning gradually replaced the manipulation of explicit formulas at the core of mathematics. This transition is particularly visible in the change of perspective involved in the quest for generalsolution formulas: the principal goal of the theory of equations in the eighteenth century was to find an algebraic-solution formula for equations of higher degrees; in other words mathematicians were searching for a closed formula for expressing the unknown x of a general equation of the fifth degree using only algebraic operations.
24. Over the next fifty years Gauss would present another three proofs of the fundamental theorem of algebra, the last of which was explicitly celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of his dissertation and updating the first proof. This quest was a purely formal and exact one; approximation methods, which were in existence, were not part of the solution, and the problem was legitimized by purely formal reasons and not by any practical relevance.
In 1824 Norwegian mathematician Abel finally resolved the question in an unexpected way. 25 With a reductio argument he proved, by studying a mathematical characterization of the hypothetical solution formulas, that the general equation of the fifth degree could not be solved algebraically. By analyzing such hypothetical solutions, imposing structures on them, and deducing statements, which could be reduced ad absurdum, Abel proved that the solution formula did not exist in the first place. Thus he proved that although the roots were known to exist (by the fundamental theorem of algebra), they could not be expressed by general algebraicsolution formulas. The formal language of algebraic solutions was more restricted than the general theory of equations. By relaxing the rules of this language to allow non-algebraic operations like the so-called elliptic functions in the formulas the solutions could be expressible, it would soon become clear, but not within the restrictions imposed by algebra.
Abel and a number of his contemporaries were well aware that something new and different was going on in mathematics. Impossibility proofs of this kind were relatively new phenomena at the time, and they relied upon taking a new and more elevated perspective. 26 In a manuscript that was not published until after his death Abel described the situation as follows:
To solve these equations [of the first four degrees], a uniform method was discovered which, it was thought, was applicable to an equation of any degree; but in spite of all the efforts of a Lagrange and other distinguished geometers, the proposed goal could not be reached. This led to the assumption that the solution of the general equation was algebraically impossible; but this could not be decided since the adopted method had only been able to lead to reli- Thus his proof of the impossibility of solving all equations algebraically led Abel to ask questions of solvability rather than solution and of representability rather than representation. 28 Once it was realized that not all equations could be solved algebraically it became a mathematical question to determine the criteria for this to be possible. Abel sketched such a theory in his manuscript, but it was left to the French mathematician Galois to outline a general theory of algebraic solvability by transforming the problem into one concerning a new mathematical concept-namely, that of groups.
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Universality and Reflectivity
Generally speaking, the Romantic period within the arts was shaped by an epistemological rebellion against the Enlightenment's love of reason. In mathematics this took the form of critical revisions of the foundations of disciplines and the scrutinizing of established forms of argument.
30 These general tendencies within both fields are well- known, but the fact that both the mathematicians and Romantic literary critics and poets strove to break free from the past and use this newly found freedom in a creative process is a commonality that has not often been explicitly addressed. However, based on previous discussions about non-Euclidian geometry, the following quote by Novalis can be seen to apply Romantic ideals to mathematics: "Mathematics is a genuine science because it contains knowledge, and a product of mental activity because it is methodologically creative" (Die Mathematik ist ächte Wissenschaft-weil sie gemachte Kenntnisse enthält-Produkte geistiger Selbstthätigkeit-weil sie methodisch genialisirt).
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This quote revolves around the great paradox that mathematics, literature and criticism, and philosophy in general dealt with during the period: that in order to navigate the Kantian divide between the ideal and the real, between that which can only be approached and the language by which to approach it, mathematicians and philosophers, poets, and critics devised tools that showed remarkable structural similarities. In the following we link the development in mathematics to Schlegel's universal poetry and the notion of Romantic irony, and in so doing illustrate the structural similarities on a deep level that go beyond explicit inspiration or biographical coincidence and instead illustrate the ways in which Romantic intellectuals tried to make sense of the new epistemological and metaphysical ideas.
From late antiquity until the Romantic era, mathematicians often believed that mathematics was a complete and adequate description of the reality of physical space and numbers and forms. This view was shattered by the above-mentioned free creations of non-Euclidean geometry, but also by the discovery that such powerful features of mathematics as the algebraic solutions of equations were ineligible for generalization. In the parallel domain of poetry Schlegel's dialectic between creation and reflexivity drove a universal poetry progressively forward. Being universal, Schlegel's vision was for a cumulative, reflexive, and critical poetry that would approach the transcendent ideal through creative and consistent iterations. As illustrated, this resembles the developments of nineteenth-century mathematics that deeply transformed the relationship between mathematics and the domain of mathematical description. Before the first decades of the nineteenth century, areas of physics, astronomy, and even social demographics were considered mathematized, in the sense that mathematical descriptions of phenomena were thought of as latching onto their domains and hence providing pre-31. Novalis, qtd. in Hamburger, "Novalis und die Mathematik" (above, n. 4), p. 19. cise, necessary, and complete formalizations. Yet on the Kantian distinction such beliefs became naïve and gradually gave way to a view of mathematics as providing possible models of various domains of reality. This is nowhere clearer than in the case of geometry, where the discoveries by Bolyai and Lobachevsky would be integrated as providing different geometries that could eventually be subsumed under a broader, more general notion of geometry. Thus instead of directly addressing physical geometry as it is, such models provide an ever-increasing sequence of reflexive formalizations that can be applied to different domains of application. The unique Euclidean space that Kant had incorporated into the pure intuition of space had been supplanted by a variety of different geometries that taken together provide a better, fuller set of (sometimes mutually exclusive) assumptions about the ideal physical space about which nothing is to be said in absolute terms.
Another trend of both mathematics and literature that is often independently identified in each discipline is an increasing reflexivity. Central to Schlegel's literary criticism was the idea of a universal poetry that would encompass all genres while at the same time remaining as literature, as well as literary criticism. Thus to him, criticism should simultaneously be both literature and meta-literature. Similarly in mathematics, new studies of existing arguments, processes, and solutions became possible by a comparable fusion of subject level and meta-level, as we have shown in the case of Abel's proof of the impossibility of algebraically solving all equations. By subjecting potential answers to mathematical scrutiny it was possible to analyze their expressive powers, hence leading to the realization that the prevailing set of approaches was insufficient to obtain the desired goal.
After Gauss's rigorous proofs of the fundamental theorem of algebra mathematicians were guaranteed that all the roots of equations were complex numbers, but following Abel's impossibility proof it was known that these roots were not generally expressible by algebraic means. Thus although the objects were known to exist they transcended the expressive power of algebraic methods. This is a direct parallel to Schlegel's notion of Romantic irony, according to which literature concerns itself with the inexpressible; from within the confinements of language (either mathematical or poetic) the purpose of the art (either mathematical or literary) is to approach the unattainable transcendental realm. To Schlegel this was precisely the reason why any universal poetry would have to be progressive, but never reaching the infinite or absolute from the point of the finite or limited. Once the limitations of language have been realized, mathematics and poetry can progress through such a dialectic movement between the absolute transcendent and the realm of the limited yet expressible language. In the case of the theory of equations, such efforts were made when mathematicians sought to include non-algebraic methods to express solutions of equations, or when they tried to discern characterizations of algebraically solvable equations using other parts of mathematics. In terms of Schlegel's Romantic irony this is a reflection of the relationship between the constantly evolving and reflexive literary criticism and the unattainable absolute. In one of his fragments Schlegel described how this process initiated by Romantic irony would be "continuously fluctuating between self-creation and self-destruction" (Athenäum fragment 51).
32 Thus the dialectic movement would extend the expressive powers of language (either poetic or mathematical) in one direction in a process of self-creation, while at the same time showing awareness of its own restrictions and separation from the unattainable absolute in a process of self-destruction.
These observations point to structural similarities on the linguistic level between poetry and literature. As a consequence of the Kantian divide both languages are incapable of demonstrating their own completeness, but through the augmentation of new perspectives and reflexive progression both languages can be brought to illustrate their own incompleteness and thus be brought in closer proximity to the unattainable ideal.
The conjoining of central developments in mathematics, such as the discovery of non-Euclidean geometry and the algebraic unsolvability of equations, with Schlegel's ideas of universal poetry and Romantic irony thus illustrates that both fields reacted to a common inspiration, and did so in ways that exhibit structural similarities. Schlegel's Buffo may appear as a random observation, and the change of perspective necessary for impossibility proofs in mathematics seems to be a sudden phenomenon; yet taken together they appear structurally similar. This serves well to illustrate the potentials of an integrative approach to the history of the literature and mathematics (and more generally science) during the period: phenomena that were frequently observed in either field can be seen to bear such marked structural resemblances that we are led to consider them not as isolated and idiosyncratic contingencies of each domain, but as deeply rooted responses to fundamental challenges. Obviously each field was already known to be influenced by Kantian thought, but we suggest that by juxtaposing their responses we are given a fuller and deeper appreciation of the ways in which poetry and mathematics, as Geisteswissenschafen, both came to search for ways to address their ideal realms from within their confined though gradually reflexive languages. Hence by conjoining the history of mathematics and literature we are able to present new historiographical perspectives, both of the fields separately and the integrated field of literature and science.
